I. INTRODUCTION
NETWOF externalities in consumption are present when the number of consumers who purchase a particular good is an important quality characteristic of that good, which affects the utility derived by consumers either directly or indirect1y.l The network externality dimension of the quality stands in contrast to the definition of quality as a physical attribute embodied in each unit of the good. Under the latter definition, quality is a decision variable under the full control of the producer, and conceptually it can be set independently of consumers' behavior. However, when quality is related to the network externality, as measured by the number of consumers using the product, a producer cannot fully control important quality characteristics of the product. In particular, the product characteristic that affects consumers' behavior is itself a function of that behavior.
*We would like to thank Avi Berman, John Marshall, Larry White, participants of the Industrial Organisation workshops at the University of California, San Diego, the University of British Columbia, University Libre de Bruxelles and the referees for helpful comments and recommendations.
' Using the terminology of Economides and White [1994] , the most important consumption externalities are present in two-way networks such as telecommunication services, where adding another subscriber to the networks affects directly the utility of all consumers (see also Rohlfs [I9741 and Oren and Smith [1981] ). However, there may be also indirect effects associated with one-way networks. Then the number of consumers who buy the same good may affect the quality of that good in terms of availability or scale of operation. For example, the number of people holding a particular credit card may affect its acceptability.
The paper adopts the formulation of consumer preferences suggested by Gabszewicz and Thisse [1979] , subsequently used in the analysis of vertical differentiation by Gabszewicz and Thisse [1980] , Sutton [1982, 19831, and Gabszewicz, et al. [1986] , and adapts it to the analysis of markets of goods with network externalities.' The existence of this externality places restrictions on the choices available to the supplier of network products. In particular, the supplier must induce consumers to join a network in order to make the network more attractive. However, facing consumers with different incomes, the provider of the network can only charge the price that the poorest consumer who joins a network is willing to pay. On the other hand, excluding the poorest consumers from the network reduces its size, and the willingness of the richer participants to pay is reduced on this account. Therefore, a provider of network products cannot take full advantage of the fact that richer consumers are willing to pay more for a bigger network, as he must lump together rich and poor consumers. Nevertheless, the largest and most expensive network is offered to the richest part of the population, and the smallest and cheapest to the poorest.
We use the model to compare two market structures, a competitive (non-cooperative) and a cartel (cooperative) one. We also compare two technological characterizations, non-compatible networks and compatible ones. These comparisons are done in terms of market coverage and consumer welfare.
When networks are not compatible with one another, we obtain that for an exogenously given number of producers, indvidual networks are smaller in the cooperative structure, and welfare is lower. Moreover, if the number of networks is allowed to reach the maximum the market can support, a cartel will provide fewer networks, thereby serving a smaller segment of the market. Consumers are unambiguously better off under the non-cooperative regime.
The comparison of the two technologies reveals that holding the number of networks fixed, market coverage in a non-cooperative structure is larger when networks are non-compatible, but welfare levels of the two technologies cannot be compared. However, the maximum number of producers that can be supported by the market is larger when the networks are compatible. As a result, under free entry market coverage is larger when there exists a single industry standard, and consumers are unambiguously better off.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I1 discusses the consumers, and in section I11 we derive the demand consistent prices.
Esser and Leruth [I9881 consider quality selection under network externalities conditions. They emphasize the duopoly case where products can be vertically differentiated by their "basic quality" controlled by producers.
For analyses of the optimal degree of product compatibility from the producer's point of view see, Katz and Shapiro [I9861 and Farrell and Saloner [1986] . We also address this question.
Section IV analyzes the equilibrium in a non-cooperative structure, and Section V considers the cooperative solution. In section VI, we turn to the compatible networks case. Section VII concludes the paper.
CONSUMERS AND PRICES
There is a continuum of consumers of measure M who are uniformly distributed according to their income on an interval J = [O,M] , where 0 c M c co. All consumers have identical tastes. They derive utility from the consumption of a private consumption good (good X) and from the consumption of a good that has network externalities. Specifically, the utility derived from the network good increases as the number of consumers who consume the same good increases. However, by its very nature, we assume that a network must be of some positive minimal size if it is to be of any use at all.
Every consumer decides whether it is worthwhile for him to give up some of the private good in order to join a network of a given size. Clearly, no consumer will join (for a positive price in terms of the alternative good) a network that is smaller than the aforementioned minimal size.4 However, all consumers are willing to give up increasing amounts of the alternative good for joining larger networks. Moreover, that amount depends on the consumer's income. We assume that the richer consumers are willing to pay more for a network of a given size than the poorer consumers.
To facilitate our computations we chose the following specification of the preferences. The size of the smallest network that is of any use is given by a strictly positive number, r. The level of utility, v, of a consumer who joins a network of size z 2 r and who consumes a quantity x of the private good X is given by
The utility derived by a consumer with income I who does not join any network is From (1) and (2) we can derive the maximum price a consumer of income I is willing to pay for joining a network of size z. If the price of joining a network of size z in terms of good Xis p, the consumer will join the network only if where (I -p) is the amount of good X consumed after paying p for the 4The minimal scale assumption is needed to bound the network size away from zero. Requirements of a similar nature have appeared in other models that use specifications like ours. See, for example, Gabszewicz et al. [1986] , where consumers' incomes are bounded away from zero.
network. In particular, it is clear from (3) that a consumer is willing to pay at most zero for a network of size r or less, no matter what his income is.
Suppose next that the consumer can choose to join one out of k different networks, where network j is of size zj and charges a price pj 2 0. Then the consumer chooses to join network i if z,
By their choice, consumers will self select into a partition of k network coalitions. Let the networks be ordered according to their size, so that z, > z,-, > . . . > z,. Since no consumer will choose network j if it is smaller but more expensive than network j + 1, we consider only prices with p, > p,-, > . . . > p,. Furthermore, it is clearly the case that if a consumer with income I chooses to join network i, then any consumer with income I' > I chooses to join network i', where i' 2 i. In fact, there exists some particular income level at which a consumer will be indifferent between joining network i or network i + 1, given the prices of these networks. This is the "marginal consumer".
Let I, be the income of the marginal consumer. Then, I, must satisfy
For i = 1 we require that the marginal consumer be indifferent between joining network 1 and not joining any network. Accordingly, Therefore, we obtain that for i = 1,2,. . . , k where we define (for convenience) p, = 0 and z, = r.
The "number" of consumers who actually join each network is induced by the partition I,,. . ., I, and the consumers' perceptions on the network sizes, z,, z,, . . . , z,. Given our assumption on the distribution of consumers over the income interval, the number of consumers who actually join network i, zq, is given byz; = Ii+, -I,, i = 1,2 ,..., k -1, and z", M -I,.
DEMAND CONSISTENT PRICES
In the previous section we found the measure of consumers who join a network, given the prices of all networks and their sizes. However, the size of any network is determined by the number of consumers who actually join it. Requiring consistency, the perceived sense of any network i, zi, must equal its actual size, zq. This requirement induces a relationship between prices and network sizes. We call these prices demand consistent prices.
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Demand consistent prices are derived as follows. Requiring zq = zi for all i, we obtain from (5) that for the largest network
From (6) we find that the value of pk that equates zj: with zk, given zk-, and pk -, is given by By recursion, we obtain the rest of the demand consistent prices. With p, = 0 and z, = r, these prices are given by From the recursion formula (8) we obtain the uniquely determined demand consistent prices for i = 1,2,. . . , k as
IV. NETWORK SIZES UNDER COMPETITION
In this section we describe an equilibrium outcome in which networks of different sizes (and prices) coexist. We show that this equilibrium may emerge from a non-cooperative game in which each producer chooses simultaneously a network size and its price.' , Specifically, let there be a large number of potential producers of network goods. Each producer can produce at most one network at a possibly positive fixed cost, c. Producers choose their network size-price combinations in anticipation of the equilibrium choices of the consumers.
We consider first the case in which k producers are allowed entry into the market. Suppose that producer i chooses to select a size-price combination of a network that is no larger than that of producer i + Accordingly, this producer chooses a profit maximizing network size-price combination, taking as given the price-size combinations chosen by all other producers and the 51n this sense our setup differs in an important way from that of the previous quality determination literature. There price and quality are two strategic variables that the competitors determine in two stages. In particular, in the second stage they may choose prices given qualities which were chosen at the first stage (see, for example, Shaked and Sutton [1982] ). In our case the choice of "quality" and prices cannot be separated.
There is no incentive to select a smaller network, since profits turn out to be positively related to size. demand consistent prices (9). In a Nash equilibrium the price-size combinations of all the other producers that are taken as given, are themselves the corresponding optimal responses.' Formally, zi is the maximizer of the following problem:
for given z j , j = 1,2,. . . k, j # i and subject to equations (9).
The first order condition obtained from (10) is given by for i = 1,2,. . ., k.*Rewriting (11) we obtain Equation (12) is a familiar reaction function to the output (and corresponding prices) of all other producers. It implies that every producer serves one half of the market left unserved by his larger competitors, plus r/2. A simultaneous solution of the set of equations (12) yields the Nash equilibrium for a given k. This equilibrium is given by Notice that zi increases in i. Therefore, pi increase in i, and consequently pizi increases in i. Furthermore, holding i fixed and letting k grow, we obtain that zi decrease in k. It can be shown that pi also decreases in k, and hence pizi (and profits) decreases in k. These observations are useful in the determination of the maximal number of producers that the market can support.
The maximal number of networks, E, is determined by two related conditions: all profits must be positive, and the minimal network size must exceed r. The positive profit condition is that for all i Condition (14) implies also that zi > r for all i (otherwise pi = 0). However, for the sake of clarity, we explicitly add the requirement that z , > r. ' An equilibrium in which different firms offer goods of different qualities and enjoy different profits is described by Shaked and Sutton [1982] . The alternative is an equilibrium in which all firms offer the same good and earn zero profits. With positive entry costs, the former is sub-game perfect, while the latter is not (see also the discussion in Tirole [1992] , p. 297) concerning the dynamic implications of such equilibria). In our case, an attempt by firm i to usurp the position of a firm with a higher index will yield an equilibrium with a single network and zero profits.
Notice that r appears in equation (1 1) due to the convention by which z, = r.
We can use (9) and (13) and the fact that pizi is decreasing in i in (14) to obtain that c must satisfy
From (13) we obtain first that for z , > r, we must have
In particular, the upper bound on the number of producers the market can support when c = 0 is given by (16). On the other hand, (15) provides an upper bound for the case that r = 0, but c > 0. This second bound yields
The two upper bounds given in (16) and (17) are just indicative of the two elements that help bind the maximum number of networks the market can support. These are the fixed cost and the minimum network size that must be p r~v i d e d .~
V. NETWORK SIZES UNDER A CARTEL AGREEMENT
In the previous section the game was non-cooperative. Each producer chose his network size-price combination taking as given the choices by all other producers. In contrast we turn now to a cooperative setting, in which the network size-price combinations are chosen jointly by a cartel.
The cartel will have to determine both the number of networks it will offer and their price-size combinations. Proceeding in an analogous way to the previous section, we first assume that the number of networks, k, is given and determine their sizes. The maximum number of networks the market can support under a cartel is hard to determine, but some results can be obtained concerning the market coverage under the two market structures.
The cartel maximizes the joint profits of all networks, as follows:
taking as given the demand consistent prices in (9).
gThe two elements that limit the number of firms will be present also in more general specifications of the model. The fact that fixed costs limit the number of firms is obvious. The existence of a minimum network size, r, that has to be provided guarantees that certainly no more than M/r networks can exist. Notice, however, that these observations are unrelated to the "finiteness property" of Shaked and Sutton [I9831 and Gabszewicz et al. [1986] , which is driven by their assumption that at sufficiently low prices even poor consumers consume the high quality goods.
Substituting (9) into (18), we obtain the first order conditions for the cartel's maximization problem, of the form (19) A + z = ( M + k r ) . e , where and Equation (19) is solved by
Analogous to the non-cooperative case, the maximum number of networks the market can support under a cartel is given by the requirement that all networks introduced earn a positive profit. Since profits decrease in i, it suffices to require that p,z, > c. As can be seen from equation (20), this condition cannot be used to obtain any closed form bound on k. Nevertheless, some indicative results can be derived about the market coverage under a cooperative and non-cooperative market structure.
The market coverage is defined by the sum of all networks' sizes. This sum in the cooperative case is given by
The market coverage in the non-cooperative case is given by
A comparison of (20) and (13) reveals that for a given k, (20) is less than (13) for any i. That is, any network will be larger in the non-cooperative structure than the corresponding network under the cooperative structure.
10Clearly, the market coverage in the non-cooperative case is larger than it is in the cooperative case. This result implies that in the cooperative solution the networks are smaller, and the prices charged for them is higher since the customers participating in any network i are richer. Thus utility of all individuals must be smaller under the cooperative structure.
The aforementioned observations are strengthened if k is allowed to be determined endogenously in each case. The last network that enters under both regimes is the one that still covers the fixed cost of its establishment. However, since the cooperative solution implies smaller networks, it is possible that the k + lth network considered for entry in the cooperative solution is of a size that is less than r (and therefore it is certainly rejected), while the k + lth network under the non-cooperative solution is larger than r, and may survive (if the fixed cost is not too high). Thus, the number of networks under the non-cooperative regime is at least as large as that of the cooperative regime. Therefore, the market coverage is larger under the non-cooperative case, and since prices are lower as well, consumers are clearly better off under the non-cooperative regime.
VI. COMPATIBLE NETWORKS
So far the different nelworks were distinct from each other, and a consumer who joined one network could not belong at the same time to any other network. In this section we change this assumption, and discuss the case where all networks are compatible, so that a consumer who joins any network in fact belongs to all networks. Formally, if there are k networks and consumer h with income I, joins network j for a price pj, his utility is given by It is obvious from (23) that the price charged by all networks must be the same. Therefore, the marginal consumer is the one who is indifferent between joining any network at a price p, or none. Accordingly, p must satisfy
In a non-cooperative game, each producer i chooses a network size zi which maximizes pizi -c taking as given Z -zi and the price function as 'OThis feature is likely to be quite general. As long as richer consumers are willing to pay more for network of a given size, a cartel will find it beneficial to offer smaller networks with more homogeneous customers in them.
given in (24). In other words, the individual producer knows the effect his decision has on the market price and takes this effect into consideration. The result of this maximization problem is It is clear from (25) that zi is independent of i, and therefore we obtain that in a symmetric solution Z must satisfy Equation (25) reveals that Z < M for all k, and that Z tends to M as k increases. Therefore, regardless of r, if the fixed cost per network c is zero, the market can support an infinite number of networks, the price of any network will be zero, and all consumers will belong to a network. This result is due to the fact that the minimal network size constraint is of no importance to an individual producer since the effective network size from the consumer's point of view is the sum of all networks in the market.
Suppose next that the fixed cost c is positive, but r = 0. Then, from (26) we obtain Accordingly, the price of joining any network is M/(k + I), which is also the size of an individual network. Since all networks must earn a positive profit, the maximum number of networks the market can support c satisfies:
We are now ready to compare the market coverage when r = 0 and c > 0 for the non-compatible and the compatible networks cases. First, holding the number of networks fixed, a comparison of (22) with (27) shows that the market coverage in the non-compatible case is larger. However, from (17) and (28) we obtain that from the maximum number of networks the market can support is larger for compatible networks. This result is due to the fact that in the compatible networks case all networks earn zero profits, while in the non-compatible network case only the smallest network earns zero profits." This observation means that with free entry and compatibility we get the largest possible market coverage at the lowest price. Therefore consumers prefer a compatible network structure to a non-compatible structure.
We turn to the comparison between compatible and non-compatible networks under the cartel structure. First we consider the compatibility choice made by a cartel. When offering non-compatible networks, the cartel must weigh the advantage of lumping together less diverse incomes against the disadvantage entailed in offering smaller (and therefore less valuable) networks. In addition, if the cartel finds it worthwhile to offer several non-compatible networks, it must duplicate the fixed costs. Depending on the specific parameter values, the cartel's decision could go either way.
The technological choice has some interesting welfare consequences. The cartel of compatible networks maximizes the joint profit, pZ -kc, by choosing Z subject to the price function (24). The joint network size is given by Z = (M + r)/2, which is independent of k.12 The market coverage is smaller than that of a cartel of non-compatible networks (unless that cartel too offers just one network). All consumers who are served by a network under either regime are better off with a cartel offering compatible networks as they enjoy a larger network at a lower price. Those consumers who are excluded from the market in the compatible network case but obtain service in the other case prefer the non-compatible structure.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have considered a model in which the quality of a good is identified by the number of consumers who consume that good. Since that number in turn depends on the quality, that quality is, in essence, determined by a market interaction.
We have used a simple parametric specification of preferences in order to obtain closed form solutions wherever possible. However, we believe that most of our results are not particular to this specification. The drivingelements of the model are the aforementioned definition of quality and the assumption that richer consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality. If that willingness grows fast enough with income, our observation that cartels offer smaller networks to fewer customers will carry through. 
